University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

2011

Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A Comparative Civil
Law and Common Law Analysis
Michael D. Murray
University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law, michael.murray1@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Murray, Michael D., "Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A Comparative Civil Law and Common
Law Analysis" (2011). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 664.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/664

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A Comparative Civil Law and Common
Law Analysis
Notes/Citation Information
Michael D. Murray, Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A Comparative Civil Law and Common Law
Analysis, 83-84 Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi-Kazancı Hukuk Dergisi 139-176 (2011).

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/664

Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis:
A Comparative Civil Law and Common Law Analysis
By Michael D. Murray



I. Introduction
In legal analysis, there are two methods of synthesis of precedent cases:
rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis. Rule synthesis refers to the
use of multiple authorities for the purpose of determining what is the
1
prevailing law—the prevailing legal rule—on an issue. Explanatory
synthesis refers to the use of multiple authorities for the purpose of
demonstrating how the law should be interpreted and applied in the
present circumstances based on how it has been interpreted and
applied in past circumstances.2 Explanatory synthesis does not seek to
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1
Rule synthesis is an inductive synthesis of authorities—including, but
not limited to, judicial opinions—found to be on point and controlling of a
legal question in order to accurately determine and state the prevailing rule
of law that governs the issue. See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis
and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT,
8 LEG. COM. & RHET. 217, 226-229 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875903
[Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis]; MICHAEL D. MURRAY &
CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS chs. 2, 5, 6 (2009)
[MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS]; MICHAEL D. MURRAY
& CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY
Appx. A (2009) [MURRAY & DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING]. For
additional information on the use of syntheses of multiple authorities to
formulate the legal rule, see RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL WRITING chs. 10-13 (5th ed. 2005); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN &
CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING
chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 2007); HELENE S. SHAPO, ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R.
FALK, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999);
Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (2002).
2
Explanatory synthesis is a qualitative method of analysis of legal
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determine what the law is, but how the law operates. Explanatory
synthesis is a method of analysis and advocacy that demonstrates how
the law will or should produce an outcome in a certain situation based
on inductive syntheses of authorities that reveal how the law has
operated in past situations. It also is a method of modern legal rhetoric
that constructs knowledge and understanding of the role of precedents
on the legal issue, persuading the audience as to the correctness or
superiority of the attorney's knowledge and understanding of how the
law works, and seeking to motivate the audience to act in the
rhetorical situation of the discourse.
In comparative study of common law and civilian legal analysis, many
scholars have noted a convergence in the two systems' use of precedent
cases.3 Although common law legal theory historically has started from
authorities, especially precedent cases, and a method of legal rhetoric that
uses induction to formulate from multiple authorities the principles
concerning how a legal test or legal standard is to be interpreted and applied.
For background on explanatory synthesis, see Michael D. Murray, Rule
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 234-40;
MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6; MURRAY &
DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING at Appx. A. See also sections II(B), V,
and VI, infra.
3
Many scholars have noted a convergence, e.g., Derek Beach, BETWEEN
LAW & POLITICS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE & EU MEMBER STATES 17 (2001); Mauro Cappelletti, The Doctrine of

Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference - or No Difference
at All?, in FESTSCHRIFT ZWEIGERT 387-88 (1981); D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1997); John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark, COMPARATIVE LAW:
WESTERN EUROPEAN & LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 551-86 (1978);
Konrad Zweigert et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 256, 259 (3d
ed. 1998); Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational

Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating
Pace of Common and Civil Law Convergence, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 625, 641
(2007); Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study,
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 211, 214-18 (1998) (book review); John H. Merryman, On
the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17
STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (1981), but the exact meaning and significance of
the convergence in the use of precedent cases remains a matter of debate.
Compare Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Foreword, in 1 Alexander Layton &
Hugh Mercer, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE (2d ed. 2004); with Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing World, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (2005) [Curran, Re-Membering Law] (appearances of
convergence are deceiving because the different legal and judicial culture of
different systems and jurisdictions disguises the true meaning of the uses of
precedent observed in different common law and civilian legal systems).
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a position that judges are fully competent to create law and change the
law through their adjudication of cases and the judicial opinions they
write,4 and civilian theory historically has started from a position that
judges are not empowered to create and change the law enacted by the
legislature but rather are to read and apply the existing law to new
cases,5 the practice of tribunals within the two families of legal
analysis6 has not reflected clear distinctions in the approach to and use
of precedent. Civilian judges refer to case law and acknowledge the
persuasive effect of precedent on their determinations,7 and common
law judges have become more civilian in their respect for legislative
authority to enact laws that determine cases.8 A common law approach
See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 47 (2002); Henry H.
Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment,
Alcohol, and other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 970 (2000); Melvin
4

Aron Eisenberg, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (1988); Michael
McHugh, The Law-Making Function of the Judicial Process, 62 AUSTL. L.J.
15, 16 (1988).
5
Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future
International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 717-26, 730-31 (2005);
Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for
Free Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1053, 1066-69 (1998);
William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677 (2000).
6
The two families of legal analysis, broadly drawn, are the civil law
family and the common law family. The term ―family‖ is hardly
distinguishing, because within each family are some fairly diverse siblings.
There are separate traditions within the civil law family—e.g., the Germanic,
Roman-Latinate, and Nordic traditions—and within the Common Law family
are the British, United States, Canadian, Australian, and other
Commonwealth and former Commonwealth countries‘ methods of analysis.
7
JOSEPH DAINOW, THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN
CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS (1974); MACCORMICK & SUMMERS,
supra n. 4; ATHANASSIOS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM § 29,
at 77 (1971); James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil
Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993); Vincy
Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A
Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); R. Moreno, Scott v.

Cokern: Of Precedent, Jurisprudence Constante, and the Relationship
Between Louisiana Commercial Laws and Louisiana Pledge Jurisprudence,

10 TUL. EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 31-60 (1995).
8
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1994);
Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 333, 345-46 (1999); Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common
Law as a Proxy for the Global Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 WIS. INT'L
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to precedent includes the theory of stare decisis, that decisions of
courts in a proper position in the hierarchy of judicial authority of the
appropriate jurisdiction shall issue opinions that are binding on lower
courts within the same hierarchy, but it is no longer a safe proposition
to suggest that a civilian judge will not find precedent to be binding
and will not follow the guidance of prior judicial determinations in the
adjudication of a new dispute.9 Similarly, a common law judge may go
to extreme lengths to distinguish precedents, and precedents of the
same court or same level of court will be rejected from time to time—
reversed, abrogated, modified, or replaced—in the name of progress
and justice.
The purpose of this article is not to trace the exact points of
convergence and comparative divergence in the use of and reliance on
precedent. Rather, I use this convergence as a platform for the
discussion of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. Explanatory
synthesis, the inductive use of precedent in a demonstrative and
persuasive presentation of how the law should be interpreted and
applied, may be distinguished from rule synthesis because it does not
depend on the precedent being binding or on the application of any
form of the doctrine of stare decisis. Explanatory synthesis as a form of
legal analysis relies on the open, scientific, inductive structure of the
analysis and the use of multiple precedents for the accuracy and
reliability of its predictions and conclusions. Rhetorically, explanatory
synthesis relies on the structure of mathematical-scientific induction
within a familiar deductive syllogistic structure, and on the open,
demonstrative, and falsifiable analysis of multiple authorities both to
create knowledge and understanding and for persuasive advocacy.
L.J. 915, 921-22 (2007). See generally ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN &
JAMES RUSSELL GORDEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH,
FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW (1998).
9
See generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 43-44,
48-49 (1969) [MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION]; F.H. LAWSON, A
COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 76, 83 (1955); Amy Coney Barrett,
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003); Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 50-56
(2003). A consistent line of precedent certainly is more likely to be cited and
followed and followed by a civilian court under the civil law theory of
jurisprudence constante. See John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1243, 1257 (1997) (book review); Dennis, supra n. 8, 54 LA. L. REV. at
15; Francesco G. Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DET.
COL. L. J. INT'L L. 121, 142 (2000) (discussing ―giurisprudenza costante‖ in
Italian law).
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Part II of this article will introduce the concepts of explanatory
synthesis as distinguished from rule synthesis, while parts V and VI
will explore the advantages of explanatory synthesis both analytically
and rhetorically as a method of demonstrating the proper
interpretation and application of precedents in civilian and common
law systems. My discussion here is qualified by two topics that bear on
the two uses of synthesis: one, the extent to which civil law and
common law systems use and rely on precedent cases as a determiner
and source of law, and two, the differing roles of precedent accepted
within the legal structure, legal culture, judicial culture, and
constitutional and statutory regime of a jurisdiction. No discussion of
synthesis will be meaningful without at least noting these important
background considerations that ultimately define and sometimes
constrain my recommendations as to the use of explanatory synthesis
and rule synthesis. Therefore, part III will discuss the first set of
factors bearing on the two forms of synthesis, namely, four different
uses and one non-use of precedent in civil law and common law
systems, and part IV will discuss the second set of factors, involving
the ability to synthesize precedents under a hierarchy of judicial
authority in the jurisdiction, within the legal culture and the judicial
culture of the jurisdiction, and under constitutional and statutory
limitations of the jurisdiction. Part V will then discuss the use of
explanatory synthesis in legal analysis and advocacy, and part VI will
conclude with a discussion of the contemporary rhetorical implications
of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis.
II. Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis
A.

Rule Synthesis

As introduced above, rule synthesis is an inductive synthesis of
authorities found to be on point and controlling of a legal question in
order to accurately determine and state the prevailing rule of law that
governs a legal issue.10 Authorities must be reconciled for their explicit
10

See sources cited in note 2 supra. This process of synthesis of

authorities that form the rule on an issue is described as fundamental, a
necessity, in modern legal method in America. See Curran, Re-Membering
Law, supra n. 4, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. at 104; Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking
Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 4
(2007); Sarah Valentine, Legal Research as a Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat
for Students and Law Schools, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 210 (2010) (citing ABA
Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Legal Education and Professional
Development — An Educational Continuum: Narrowing the Gap 152 (ABA
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statements and pronouncements of the governing legal standards as
well as examined for implicit requirements that are induced from the
controlling authorities. Legal analysis employs synthesis of the rules to
make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles
that govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the ―R‖ (Rule)
section of the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the
legal reasoning syllogism.11 Rule synthesis is used to formulate the
governing legal standards on an issue of law, both the definitional
rules12 and interpretive rules13 from the authorities.
1992)).

On syllogistic structure, see MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING
AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 2, 5, 6; Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory
Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 219-20. On the ―R‖ section of typical
structural paradigms—TREAT, IRAC, IREAC—see LINDA H. EDWARDS,
LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20
(5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive
discourse); MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7
(discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs
and Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club,
18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006) (discussing IRAC and IREAC);
Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 484-87, 492 (2003) (discussing
IRAC and IREAC). The second half of the major premise of the syllogism is
defined through explanatory synthesis, as discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 23, 46-47.
12
A definitional rule defines a legal rule or legal standard providing the
terms, elements, or requirements of the rule or standard. MURRAY &
DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 4, 5. For example, in
United States copyright law, the rule defining parody as a form of comment
and criticism under 18 U.S.C. § 107 (2011) is a definitional rule, see Campbell
v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), as is the definition of ―parody‖
as the use of some elements of a prior author's work to create a new one that,
at least in part, comments on or criticizes the original author's work. Id. at
580.
13
An interpretive rule is a rule issued by a court or provided in another
primary legal authority (constitution, statute, or administrative rule or
regulation) that instructs attorneys and judges on the proper interpretation
and application of a definitional rule. MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING
AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 4, 5. For example, the rules that the United States
copyright fair use factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 are to be weighed together in a
case-by-case analysis in light of the purposes of copyright law where no one
factor predominates over the other factors, and commercial usage is simply
one factor to be weighed with the others and is not a dispositive factor, all are
interpretive rules created by the United States Supreme Court that instruct
the lower courts and the copyright bar as to how the copyright fair use factors
are to be interpreted and applied. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78, 584-85.
11
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Rule synthesis has been described as vital to the common law system,14
and in fact, the doctrine of rule synthesis or rule proof is premised on
the theory that case law and administrative law can and do alter the
contents and requirements of the law, thus making it necessary to
consider and synthesize multiple sources that apply to the issue.
Rule synthesis differs from explanatory synthesis in two key ways:
first, rule synthesis seeks to define the law. It is a method of synthesis
of multiple sources of the law that seeks to state the actual rule and
legal standards that govern the issue at hand. Rule synthesis analyzes
the legal authorities in order to formulate the law that addresses the
legal question. Second, rule synthesis requires the use of applicable
controlling authorities that have the power to define the rule and legal
standards governing the issue. The authorities can be constitutional,
statutory, regulatory, administrative, or case law, but they must be
binding, mandatory authority as to the tribunal, the parties, and the
parties‘ issue so that they can define the rules on the issue.15
B.

Explanatory Synthesis

Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a
separate process of induction of principles of interpretation and
application concerning the rules governing a legal issue. The induction
is from samples—namely case law—representing specific situations
with concrete facts and in which the legal rules have been applied to
produce a concrete outcome. While rule synthesis is the component of
legal analysis that determines what legal standards apply to and
control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to demonstrate and
communicate how these legal standards work in various situations
Curran, Re-Membering Law, supra n. 4, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. at 104;
Gionfriddo, supra n. 11, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. at 4 ; Valentine, supra n. 11, 39
U. BALT. L. REV. at 210; ABA Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to Bar, Legal
14

Education and Professional Development — An Educational Continuum:
Narrowing the Gap 152 (ABA 1992).

Even absent case law, rule synthesis is used to combine and reconcile
different legal authorities on an issue. Constitutional law may affect
statutory law or administrative and regulatory law, and even within a
category, an issue may implicate several statutory code provisions which
must be coherently reconciled through rule synthesis. An example in United
States copyright law is the need to synthesize references to Title 17, U.S.
Code, sections 101, 106, 106A, and 107 in order to determine fair use or
infringement of copyrighted works, and to determine if a work is protected by
the American Visual Artists Rights Act.
15
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relevant to the legal issue at hand.

16

Explanatory synthesis does not seek to define the law nor does it
require exclusively controlling authorities for its analysis. Explanatory
synthesis seeks to demonstrate how the law has worked in prior
situations in order to provide guidance to the tribunal in the current
situation. Explanatory synthesis uses cases as examples—samples—of
the disposition of legal issues in specific, concrete situations rather
than using them as dispositive authority on the rules governing the
issue. The analysis and predictions formed in explanatory synthesis
may be stronger and more persuasive if the cases used in the synthesis
are themselves binding authority with respect to certain legal issues
before the tribunal, but it is equally important to use adequate
numbers of relevant, analogous cases in the synthesis. The analytical
and rhetorical value of the synthesis to guide and persuade the
disposition of the present case is based largely on the fact that that
guiding principles are drawn from multiple samples of dispositions of
similar cases.17
III. Five Uses of Legal Precedents in Common Law and Civilian
Systems
I offer this discussion of five uses18 of legal precedents in civil law and
common law systems merely as a backdrop for the discussion of rule
synthesis and explanatory synthesis. The five uses of precedent are:



Use of precedent cases as binding, mandatory authority
Use of precedent cases as a source of law

16

See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 6, 7
(discussing explanatory synthesis); Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory
Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 226-30 (same).
17
The numeric advantage of explanatory synthesis (see section V infra)
is combined with the scientific and mathematical structure of the analysis
that presents its reasoning in an open, demonstrative format for examination
and potential refutation of the components of the analysis. It is this openness
and potential for examination and rebuttal that produces the persuasive
element of falsifiability in explanatory synthesis. When a synthesis is not
rebutted by an opponent or other participant in the case, it stands as highly
reliable and persuasive. See Michael D. Murray, Law & Economics as a
Rhetorical Perspective in Law, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author) [Murray, Law & Economics
as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law].
18
As will be seen here, this actually is a list of four uses and one ―nonuse.‖
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Use of precedent cases as a source of reasoning
Use of precedent cases as a source of narrative reasoning
Use of precedent cases as non-authority

Each of these uses impacts the use of rule synthesis, but explanatory
synthesis is less affected by these differences in weight and authority
given to precedent cases. The five uses differ in their requirements as
to the acceptance of precedent as binding authority or an actual source
of the law, which in turn requires an assessment of whether both rule
synthesis (to determine the applicable rules and legal standards by
synthesis and induction from precedents) applies in the situation, or
only explanatory synthesis (to determine how the applicable rules and
legal standards properly are to be interpreted and applied by induction
from precedents).
A.

Precedent cases as binding, mandatory authority

In systems that accept some form of the stare decisis doctrine,
precedent cases may be binding, mandatory authority in the
adjudication of legal disputes. The form of stare decisis need not be the
strongest, most rigid form that provides that precedents, if relevant
and applicable to the issue, must be followed without deviation by the
issuing court, courts on the same level of the hierarchy of judicial
authority as the issuing court, or courts on any lower level of the
applicable hierarchy of judicial authority. This is by no means the most
common embodiment of the stare decisis doctrine even in common law
settings; even the United States Supreme Court19 and the Appellate
Panel of the British House of Lords20 have accepted a version of stare
19

See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S.

587, 615 (2007);
Federal Election Com'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500-01
(2007);
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 543 (1962); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940). Relevant
instances of the Court's approach to stare decisis are West Virginia Bd. of Ed.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), overturning Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), overturning Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
20
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L),
110 SOLICITOR'S JOURNAL 584 (1966), overturning the more rigid position
that the House of Lords was bound by its own decisions, established in
London Tramways v. London City Council, [1898] A.C. 375, 380. See also
Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 102-08, 135-43 (4th
ed. 1991); W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion
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decisis where precedents may be changed or abrogated when
conditions warrant a change in the law.
In a system of law where precedent cases may be binding authority,
the use of rule synthesis to prove the contents of legal rules and define
legal standards is not simply an option for legal analysis, it should be
required. A progression of cases that, together with statutory and
regulatory law, define the legal standards that answer a legal issue
should be presented in writing by virtue of a synthesis of the
authorities, namely the code provisions, regulations, and precedent
cases that define the legal rule. In the same system, explanatory
synthesis is particularly effective and persuasive when precedents that
define the rules also may be used as examples of situations where the
rules were applied to produce a concrete outcome based on a concrete
set of facts of the dispute. Explanatory synthesis draws from these
controlling precedents and other, non-controlling precedents, the
principles of how the rules are meant to operate.
B.

Precedent cases as a source of law

If the system and tribunal accepts the possibility that cases are useful
as a source of law, then citation and reliance on cases as persuasive
authority for definitional rules and interpretive rules is possible.
Precedents will be relied on and may in fact be determinative unless
they are distinguished or overcome with equally weighty reasoning
based on other legal authority, but the use of precedents does not have
to be mandatory and binding and stare decisis need not apply. The
opportunity to use precedents persuasively and rhetorically to prove
the existence of a definitional rule or an interpretive rule means that
rule synthesis is possible because legal standards may be formulated
from a group of cases, and explanatory synthesis is possible because
principles concerning the proper interpretation and application of the
law also may be induced from multiple cases.
C.

Precedent cases as a source of reasoning

In various systems, precedents are cited and relied on not for
determination of the law and applicable legal standards, but as a legal
source on the reasoning and policy behind a judicial decision. The cases
do not bind the court in its determination, but rather are used as
rationale for the decision. Both civil law and common law courts cite
precedents for the purpose of explaining, supporting, or justifying the
of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1967).
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reasoning of judicial opinions without necessarily conforming to or
relying on the precedents as mandatory authority.21
In these circumstances, rule synthesis may not be employed because
the authorities in question are not being accepted and relied on to
prove the rule and define the legal standards that govern the issue.
Instead, explanatory synthesis may be used to draw from cases as
examples—samples—of situations where the law has been applied to
produce concrete outcomes and to synthesize these samples based on
the common principles of law and policy that unite the different
samples. This form of demonstrative, inductive reasoning does not
depend on the case samples being controlling any more than a single
sample in a biological experiment is controlling of the operation of the
experiment and the demonstration of what the experiment proves. The
principles induced in the scientific, inductive process do not have the
conclusive effect of binding, mandatory authority from a higher court,
but they are persuasive and reliable because they use an open,
demonstrative, falsifiable method to present the principles of how the
law should be interpreted and applied in a given situation based on the
induction of these principles from multiple situations in the past.22
21

MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION at 47; Dana T. Blackmore,

Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-Precedent Rule in
International Trade Law — Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute
Settlement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 487, 497-99 (2004); Jean
Carbonnier, Authorities in Civil Law: France, in JOSEPH DAINOW, THE ROLE
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED
JURISDICTIONS 91, 97 (1974); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common

Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the
European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 72-74 (2001); Giuseppe di Federico
and Carlo Guarnieri, The Courts in Italy, in JEROLD WALTMAN & KENNETH
HOLLAND, THE POLITICAL ROLE OF LAW COURTS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES
175 (1988); Lundmark, supra n. 4, 46 AM J. COMP. L. at 214-15. See also
Maurice Adams, The Rhetoric of Precedent and Comparative Legal Research,
62 MOD. L. REV. 464 (1999).
22
Explanatory synthesis informs the major premise of the deductive,
syllogistic structure of the discourse through induction of principles
concerning how the rules should be interpreted and applied. The process of
induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its relationship to
a number of other specific propositions that are known to be true. A certain
genus of situations with identifiable characteristics can be defined from a
synthesis of known situations (―species‖ of situations, or ―precedents‖) that all
share these characteristics. See Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric §§ 5(C),
7.4, in Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2002 ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/
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D.

Precedent cases as a source of narrative reasoning

The analogical and rhetorical use of precedent cases as a source of
narrative forms and ―stories‖ in the law is well recognized in American
legal method.23 Precedent cases contain a story, and multiple
precedents can contain the same storyline or directly related and
analogous storylines. In American legal method, an attorney often
relates her client‘s situation to one or more of the precedent storylines
if the outcome of the stories in the precedents is favorable to the client;
aristotle-rhetoric/> (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002).
The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal discourse
and rhetoric derived from the classical tradition, in which there are two
permitted logical structures for an argument, the deductive and the inductive.
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a (W. Rhys Roberts transl.
1965); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell
transl., 1949); 1 MARIUS FABIUS QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273 (H.E.
Butler transl., 1954). The forms for effective legal discourse, as opposed to
mathematical, scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic rhetorical form
known as an enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an
example or paradigm argument. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra, at Book I,
ch. 2 at 1356b. See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A
THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 40 & n. 49 (1991). Aristotle believed the
enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC,
supra, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b. Legal method in the
United States nearly uniformly promotes the use of a deductive syllogistic (or
enthymatic) form for the presentation of legal analysis in writing. A logical,
demonstrative presentation lends credibility and persuasiveness to the
discourse and reasoning. In rhetorical terms, the use of a deductive syllogistic
structure such as IRAC, IREAC, TREAT, and others, is a firmly established
expectation if not a requirement of discourse within the legal writing
discourse community. See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk:
Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489
(2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is ―Logic‖ Culturally Based? A Contrastive,
International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEG. EDUC. 157,
164-77 (1997).
23
See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures

Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor,
Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 259, 266-69, 307 (2009); Douglas M. Coulson, Legal Writing and
Disciplinary Knowledge-Building: A Comparative Study, 6 J. ASS'N L.
WRITING DIRS. 160, 167-68, 195-97 (2009); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne
Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing
Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001);
Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at
220-21.
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by the same token, an attorney will attempt to tell a new story of the
client to distinguish one or more precedent cases whose stories do not
support a favorable disposition of the client‘s case.
One method employed in narrative reasoning using precedent cases is
case-to-case analogical reasoning. This one-to-one comparison of the
client's story to the storyline of a single precedent follows a familiar
methodology of narrative reasoning: if the story of the client is the
same as the story of the precedent, the ending of the story (the outcome
and disposition) should also be the same in both cases. Mythical,
archetypical story forms serve a similar cognitive, information
processing and comprehension role: the attorney story-teller suggests
that a mythical, archetypical form is represented in the client's case as
a way of causing the audience—the tribunal or the finder of fact (i.e.,
the jury)—to process the facts of the case in a favorable way.24
Rule synthesis is not designed to exploit the narrative values of
precedents because the focus of rule synthesis is the legal rules in the
cases and how they have been altered or amended through the
workings of the precedent. Rule synthesis seeks to induce legal rules—
definitional rules and interpretive rules—from the precedents. Its
focus is not on the facts of the case and lessons learned from the
This discussion merely scratches the surface of the theory and practice
of the story-telling movement and narrative reasoning discipline in legal
analysis, but for further reading, I offer the following sources: ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113-14 (2000); DAVID RAY
PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING
AND THE LAW (1991); Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997); Berger, supra n. 24, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259;
Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 71 SOC. RES. 691, 692 (2004); Linda H.
Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal
Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV.
807 (1993); Foley & Robbins, supra n. 24, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459; J.
Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name: A Rhetorical Reading of
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator's Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
781 (1992); Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and
to this Symposium, 14 L. WRITING: J. L. WRITING INST. 3 (2008); Ruth Anne
Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative
Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 717 (1994); James Boyd
White, Reading Law and Reading Literature: Law as Language, in JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 77 (1985).
24
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application of the legal rules in various factual scenarios.
On the other hand, explanatory synthesis is perfectly adapted to the
use of facts and storylines from precedent cases in the induction of
principles of how the law properly is to be applied to produce certain,
predictable dispositions in certain, concrete factual scenarios or storysettings. The use of facts and storylines within the context of a legal
setting is the exact focus of explanatory synthesis.25
It is less apparent that judges and lawyers in civil law systems
participate in this form of reasoning and legal discourse. Certainly,
analogical reasoning is used whenever current cases are compared to
earlier precedent cases, but the exact use of the storyline or narrative
elements of earlier precedents may be less common. One obvious
reason lies in the judicial culture and practices of case reporting in civil
law systems that downplays, simplifies, or eliminates the discussion of
facts in case reports. It is difficult, or at times impossible, to piece
together a synthesis of the common storylines of a group of applicable
precedent cases if the reports of the cases neglect to mention the facts
and storyline of each precedent case.26
E.

Precedent cases as non-authority

If by law or by established rules and regulations, cases may not be
cited and relied on in judicial decisions, then precedent cases are nonauthority. This is the only situation when rule synthesis and
explanatory synthesis may not be employed because there is no
authority to cite cases let alone synthesize them, and any attempt to
produce a synthesis in legal writing would be a violation of the rules
and potentially would constitute malpractice.
IV.

Factors Affecting Syntheses of Precedents

The divergence in the usage of precedent does not disqualify the use of
synthesis for the demonstration and explanation of how the law
operates in specific, relevant situations in four out of the five uses
discussed in the section above. Both civilian and common law judges
use precedent in the four ways described above—judges in both
systems cite precedent in their opinions, and attorneys in both systems
cite precedent in their briefs. But the extent to which rule synthesis or
explanatory synthesis may or should be employed by attorneys in their
25
26

See examples in section V, infra.
See discussion in section IV(C), infra.
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brief-writing further depends on four factors particular to the
jurisdiction, and not necessarily dependent on a label of common law
vs. civilian regarding the jurisdiction. These factors are:





A hierarchy of judicial authority in the jurisdiction
Legal culture and its accepted uses of precedent within the
jurisdiction‘s legal writing discourse community
Judicial culture and its approach to decision-writing and casereporting
Constitutional or statutory provisions and restrictions

The full exploration of these factors is beyond the scope of this article,
but I will briefly note how several of these factors would limit the use
of rule synthesis of precedent cases to prove the contents of a legal rule
and define a legal standard; these factors also partially limit the scope
of the analysis of authorities and the predictions and recommendations
made through explanatory synthesis, but do not eliminate the
opportunity for the use of explanatory synthesis altogether.
A.

Hierarchy of judicial authority

Common law practitioners might take it for granted that a court
system will be arranged in a hierarchical manner and that courts
higher up on the scale will have the power of judicial review over any
courts lower down in the hierarchy. This is not to be taken for granted
in civilian systems; it must be determined whether there are levels of
courts and appellate courts with judicial review in the court structure
of the jurisdiction.27

For example, Italy‘s court system is designed in such a way that
courts are not directly reviewed by the Cour de Cassassione (Court of
Cassation) on the basis of its placement on a certain tier of a hierarchy. The
high court is separate from the hierarchies of other courts, and it reviews the
law—i.e., legal issues, questions of law—only. Other courts may take into
account Court of Cassation cases as highly persuasive authority, particularly
a line of opinions accepted as giurisprudenza costante, but the lack of a
hierarchical structure of review has a direct bearing on whether a trial or
intermediate level court should consider an opinion of the Court of Cassation
to be a controlling authority. See Antonio Baldassarre, Structure and
Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 649
(1996); Mazzotta, supra n. 10, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DET. COL. L. J. INT'L L. at 134;
William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint:
Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (1999).
27
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Rule synthesis requires binding authority that has the potential to
shape the law, but the method of explanatory synthesis, which does not
seek to define the law but to explain and advocate how the law
properly is to be interpreted and applied, fits more of the uses because
it does not require precedent to be binding, nor does it require
precedent to be accepted as a source of law. It also is not directly
dependent on a hierarchy of judicial authority. Cases are used for their
relevance to the dispute and their storyline, not purely for their power
as mandatory authority. Indeed, the absence of a hierarchy may free
counsel to make more aggressive and complex syntheses of authorities
unhampered by the particular level of court that issued the opinion.28
At the very least, the absence of an established hierarchy of judicial
authority opens up cases from more levels of courts for analysis using
explanatory synthesis.
I do not want to overstate this point: I repeat that even when using
explanatory synthesis, drawing from cases from the highest,
controlling courts is the superior practice when those cases exist and
are on point on the issue. An attorney cannot ignore the established
hierarchy of judicial authority, if one exists, and simply pick favorable
cases from lower level courts to synthesize, ignoring a batch of
unfavorable cases from higher, controlling courts. Instead, the
attorney must work with the authority on point and reconcile the
29
opinions through synthesis.
B.

Legal culture and its accepted uses of precedent

The four uses and one non-use of precedent discussed above represent
the legal culture of a jurisdiction and its acceptance of, tolerance for, or
rejection of the use of precedent cases for one or more of the possible
uses of precedent. This culture is more than a cautionary suggestion
or inconvenience; it represents conventions that define whether certain
uses of precedent can be employed by practitioners or judges, or will
Naturally, this strategy is highly contingent on the acceptance of
citation of trial level or lower level courts in any capacity within the legal
community and its culture, as discussed in the section below.
29
If the authorities largely are unfavorable, then the attorney might
attempt to argue for a change in the law drawing from cases, statutory and
code provisions, and from secondary authorities the points of public policy
that support the change in the requirements or in the interpretation of the
law. This, too, is accomplished through explanatory synthesis. If there is no
support for the change in the cases, code, or opinio juris of the jurisdiction,
then the attorney should rethink the client's situation and her strategy in
representing the client.
28
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the use cost the author credibility and persuasion for ignoring or
bucking the convention. In rhetorical terms, the acceptance, toleration,
or rejection of precedent becomes an expectation of the legal writing
discourse community, and therefore, it goes to the heart of the author's
ability to communicate to build knowledge and understanding, let
alone persuade the audience through the discourse. No description of
synthesis, no matter how rosy, will overcome the demands and
requirements of the legal writing discourse community if the
community does not accept or tolerate the use of precedent cases
employed in the synthesis.
C.

Judicial Culture and Case Reporting

Judicial culture and case reporting as noted here refers to how judges
draft and report their opinions in cases. The ability to synthesize cases
depends in part on the judge or the reporter of cases providing enough
information to allow practitioners to make connections between cases
or to draw from the facts, storyline, or public policies within cases.
As one brief example, if the courts reporting four copyright fair use
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—
Salinger v. Colting,30 Blanch v. Koons,31 Castle Rock Entertainment v.
32
33
Carol Publishing Group, and Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures —had
not included the specific facts of each case and a detailed description of
how those facts interacted with the public policies of copyright law in
general and copyright fair use law in particular, practitioners would
not be able to tell the difference between a use that is held to exploit
the original material copied for the same purposes and toward the
same ends as the original work34 as compared to cases where the
second work changed the character, nature, and purpose of the original
material in such a way that the original work was not exploited in any
manner contrary to the public policy of copyright law that promotes
the creation of original works.35 Because the courts did include this
information, we are able to form the following explanatory synthesis to
explain the operation of the fair use provision in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals:
A use that exploits the original material copied for
30
31
32
33
34
35

607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
See Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; Castle Rock, 150 F.3d 132.
See Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Liebovitz, 137 F.3d 109.
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the same purposes and toward the same ends as
the original work will not be a fair use of the
original work, but a second work will be a fair use
if it changes the character, nature, and purpose of
the original material in such a way that the
original work is not exploited in any manner that
is contrary to the public policy of copyright law
that promotes the creation of original works.
Compare Salinger, 607 F.3d 68 (60 Years LaterComing Through the Rye held to exploit the same
themes, same story arc, same characters, and same
situations as the original work, Catcher in the Rye,
and was held not to be fair), and Castle Rock, 150
F.3d 132 (Seinfeld trivia book held to exploit the
original material from the Seinfeld television show
for the same purposes—comedy and
entertainment—for which the original material
was created, and was held not to be fair), with
Blanch, 467 F.3d 244 (Jeffrey Koons' work, Niagra,
transformed the content, context, and meaning of
Blanch's original fashion photograph in a manner
that completely changed the theme and purpose of
the work from one of fashion and allure to one that
critically commented on our society's hungers and
appetites, and was held to be fair), and Liebovitz,
137 F.3d 109 (Naked Gun movie ad changed the
content, context, and meaning of the original
photograph from one of serious, artistic
photography celebrating classical beauty to one of
a spoof of beauty when the original female star's
head was replaced on her body by the head of a
famous male comedian, and was held to be fair).

Common law system judges and practitioners might assume that all
courts in all systems give detailed descriptions of the background and
operative facts of each case that is adjudicated, along with a careful
accounting of the procedural history of the case and an explanation of
the rationale for the court's decision supported by citations to
authorities. In fact, this description only applies in a general manner
to courts in common law systems. Civil law courts vary in the extent to
which facts, explanation or justification of the court's rationale, or
citation to authorities are routinely used or ever used in reports of
decisions. As one example, Italy routinely reports the decisions of the
high court—the Cour de Cassassione (Court of Cassation)—in the form
of a massima (pl., massime), an abstract of the legal rule applied in the
case, devoid of any description of the facts or how the law applied to
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the facts to produce the outcome in the case.36 This practice allows rule
synthesis if the legal rule or rules from the case are reported or at least
abstracted, but it leaves no opportunity for the use of precedent cases
as a source of rationale and legal reasoning, nor does it preserve the
opportunity to use cases as a source of the storyline and legal narrative.
Thus, the limits imposed by the judicial culture and case reporting
practices of the jurisdiction are real and potentially significant for any
use of rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis in legal practice.
D.

Constitutional or Statutory Provisions Affecting the Use
of Precedent

The last factor to note in the analysis of whether rule synthesis or
explanatory synthesis is viable within the jurisdiction is the extent to
which civil code or constitutional provisions affect the potential uses of
precedent. The law may restrict the citation of and reliance on
precedent cases for certain purposes or in certain contexts. A simple,
but straightforward example is a code provision that provides that
precedent cases are not authority,37 indicating that precedent cases
should not be cited or relied upon as a source of the law or binding
legal authority in legal writing and reasoning. On the other hand, use
of precedent cases may be encouraged by constitutional or statutory
provisions and the manner in which these provisions are interpreted
and applied in the jurisdiction. In several civil law jurisdictions, the
use of general clauses38 or reasoning by analogy to other related but
not specifically applicable sections of the code in order to cover new
issues not contemplated by the drafters of the code39 simulates the
36

Curren, Re-Membering Law, supra n. 4, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 103;
Mazzotta, supra n. 10, 9 MICH. ST. U.J. INT'L L. at 129-31, 150-51; John
Henry Merryman, The Italian Style III: Interpretation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 583,
587, 593 (1966); Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in
MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS at 141, 148.
37
E.g., Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch),
ABGB § 12; French Civil Code, C. Civ. art. 5; N.C.P.C. art. 455 (France);
Italian Codice Civile, C.C. Capo I; Spanish Civil Code (Codigo Civil), C.C. art.
1(1); Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, ZGB art. I.
38
Regarding the use of general clauses, see Austrian Allgemeines
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB §§ 7, 914; German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch,
BGB §§ 138, para. 1, 242, 826; French Civil Code, C. Civ. arts. 1134 para. 3,
1135, 1160; Italian Codice Civile, C.C. arts. 1374, 1375; Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch,
ZGB art. 2 para. 2.
39
Regarding the use of reasoning by analogy to other code provisions,
see 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 40, 130 (4th ed.
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same process of analogical reasoning and extension of principles and
public policy reflected in the law to new situations in new cases that is
represented by the processes of rule synthesis and explanatory
synthesis.40 Practitioners must be alert for the opportunity to
synthesize code provisions in an analogical use of rule synthesis as
well as to combine interpretive rules with public policy sources through
explanatory synthesis.
V. Use of Explanatory Synthesis for Legal Analysis
Explanatory synthesis contemplates that what judges say does not
always match what they do.41 Courts might describe a rule or legal
standard (tell what the rule is), but it remains for subsequent cases to
illustrate the legal standard in actual legal situations (show what the
rule means). If a copyright court says, ―a transformative work [in
copyright fair use law] is one that 'adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new
expression, meaning or message,'‖42 that pronouncement gives little
guidance as to what changes or additions to works actually add
something new, changing the purpose or character of the original work,
and altering the original work with sufficiently new expression,
meaning, or message. Cases provide the answer. Cases are concrete
1869); Baudenbacher, supra n. 9, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. at 338; S. Herman, The

Equity of the Statute and Ratio Scripta: Legislative Interpretation Among
Legislative Agnostics and True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REV. 535 (1994);
Herman & Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure: Historical Experience,
Modern Formats, and Policy Considerations, 54 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1022-41
(1980); 1 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das
Deutsche Reich 16 (1888); Konrad Zweigert & H.J. Puttfarken, Statutory
Interpretation—Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704 (1970).
Rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis are flexible in the choice of
sources to synthesize. Statutory and code provisions, secondary authorities,
and sources of opinio juris all can be synthesized by using an inductive
method to draw rules or interpretive principles from multiple authorities.
41
This is not a recent observation. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (Oceana Pub. 1960) (orig. ed. 1930). See also BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–25, 51–63 (Yale U.
Press 1949) (orig. ed. 1921) (evaluation of precedents in a process of
induction); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 8, 9,
11–12 (Greenwood 1970) (orig. ed., Colum. U. Press 1928) (induction and
―relativity‖ concerning precedents); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 2–3, 5, 8, 26, 29–30 (U. Chi. Press 1949); Robert A. Leflar,
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810,
819 (1961).
42
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
40
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examples of situations where the rules were applied to produce an
outcome; there are winners and losers in each case. In the copyright
example from section IV above, the winners are those who properly
transformed original works and the losers are those who did not.43
Explanatory synthesis examines the data set of cases to induce the
illustrations of how the rules work, and synthesizes the case
illustrations into principles that provide a guide for the proper
interpretation and application of the law.44 The statement of the
principles is persuasive because it is produced using induction in a
form of open demonstrative reasoning supported by a weighty number
of authorities.45
Explanatory synthesis is reported in the ―E‖ section (explanation
section) of TREAT (Thesis- Rule- Explanation- Application- Thesis
restated) and IREAC (Issue- Rule- Explanation- ApplicationConclusion) paradigms.46 The structure of explanatory syntheses is
The theory of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis recognizes that
cases are not rules; cases contain rules, they pronounce rules, they adopt
rules and interpret rules and apply the rules to facts, but judicial opinions
are themselves not rules. Rule synthesis reports the synthesized results of
courts‘ adoption, interpretation, and pronouncement of legal rules. Thus, rule
synthesis is sometimes referred to as ―rule proof.‖ Explanatory synthesis is
different, separate from rule proof. It uses cases as a source of information on
the application of the rules to facts, the concrete factual situations of the
cases themselves. See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8
Leg. Com. & Rhet. at 220.
44
See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS at ch. 6.
45
See Murray, Law & Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law,
supra n.18, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573 (forthcoming) (discussing the
rhetorical advantages of open, demonstrative reasoning).
46
Structural Paradigms such as TREAT and IREAC and IRAC are
themselves based on a deductive reasoning syllogism or enthymeme. The
Thesis (TREAT form) or Issue (IREAC or IRAC forms) section states the
question to be answered in the analysis, the Rule section (of all forms) and
Explanation section (of TREAT and IREAC forms) states the major premise
of the deduction, and the Application section (of all forms) states the minor
premise of the deduction, and the Thesis restated (TREAT form) or
Conclusion (IREAC or IRAC forms) states the conclusion formulated in the
deduction. Syllogistic-Enthymatic forms are standard for the exposition of
legal writing in both common law and civilian systems. See Baudenbacher,
supra n. 9, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. at 334, 354; D. Neil MacCormick, Le
Raisonnement Juridique, 33 ARCH. PHIL. D. 99, 103 (1988); André Tunc,
Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 467 (1976);
Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 YALE J.
INT'L L. 67, 83-84 (1996); ATHANASSIOS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
43
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designed for demonstrative inductive reasoning that presents the
principles concerning how the rules are to be interpreted and applied
first, followed by the authorities from which the principles are induced.
The structure of an explanatory synthesis has three parts:
Principle—citations—parentheticals.47
Each principle is to be induced from multiple authorities, so the
citation will appear different from a statement of the rule in the rule
section where only one statute or at most a very small number of
controlling authorities is the source of a definitional rule. Each
authority in the synthesis is used as an example of a situation where
the rule was applied to produce a concrete outcome. Each synthesis
has one principle supported by multiple citations to authorities, and
each citation has a parenthetical that explains in as few words as
possible the facts and circumstances and outcome of the case relevant
to the application of the rule. Thus the complete structure is the
following:
Interpretive Principle—Citation 1 (details concerning the
application of the rule in citation 1); Citation 2 (details
concerning the application of the rule in citation 2); Citation 3
(details concerning the application of the rule in citation 3); and
so on.48
An example from an actual authority is:
Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when
an original work is merely retransmitted in a

supra n. 8, at 89.
Each part is necessary: the principle stated is the product of the
induction. It reveals the interpretive principle concerning how the rules are
to be interpreted and applied based on the case examples cited in the
synthesis. The citations are necessary to show that the principle is supported
by multiple authorities. And the parentheticals explain the details of facts,
policy, holding, and outcome of the rule application that are necessary to
explain how each case example supports the interpretive principle stated in
the synthesis. All of the parts must be stated openly because this is
demonstrative reasoning, open to examination and refutation, and thus
highly persuasive if it is not rebutted. See Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COMM. & RHET. at 221; MURRAY & DESANCTIS,
LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6.
48
See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6.
SYSTEM,
47
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different medium. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding that retransmission of radio broadcast
over telephone lines is not transformative); LA
News Service v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 149
F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
reproducing news footage without editing the
footage is not very transformative); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
reproduction of audio CD into computer MP3
format does not transform the work).49

The principle is a statement concerning the proper application of the
rule induced from cases. The citations are to the authorities from
which the principle is induced. Parentheticals are provided for each
citation to explain and illustrate how the authority supports the
principle. Parentheticals allow the author to give just enough
information (facts, public policy, or other relevant details) as is
necessary to demonstrate how the authority supports the proposition.50
The following examples, once again from United States copyright law
cases,51 are offered to demonstrate the method:
The use of an artistic original work will be
deemed transformative when the use adds valuable artistic changes to the original giving the reI chose a fairly short and succinct example taken out of an actual
legal authority to illustrate the form of the method. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). As explained below, a large
part of the effectiveness, reliability, and persuasiveness of an explanatory
synthesis comes from the use of significant numbers of precedent cases in the
synthesis from which the principles are induced. Therefore, a synthesis of
only three cases would be a minimal number not an optimal number nor a
target number of precedent cases to use. Syntheses of five, six, or seven cases
are more effective and persuasive than syntheses of three cases, and,
depending on the topic of the synthesis, larger numbers certainly may be
used to support an effective, reliable, and persuasive statement of the
principles induced. The limitation on the number of cases for an individual
syntheses may be more closely tied to the amount of information that must be
stated in the parenthetical for each so that an individual synthesis does not
run on for several pages of text.
50
See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS, supra n. 7, at
ch. 6 (explaining the methodology and giving examples).
51
I have used a short form for citations to conserve space.
49
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sulting work new artistic meaning and artistic
expression.52 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-80
(rap group added new musical style and genre and
new lyrics to original rock ballad creating a new
musical composition with a new meaning);
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244 (artist placed original fashion magazine photographic image into painting
combining image with additional images of junk
food and Niagra Falls to make new expression
concerning the appetites flowing through modern
society); Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 109 (movie poster
changed original photograph from a work of serious art with historical Renaissance art reference
to one of comic art with a new message of buffoonery).
The artistic changes must create a new meaning
and new expression; if the original is simply
redisplayed, reproduced, rebroadcast, or
redistributed in a new mode or method of
exploiting the same creative artistic virtues of the
original work, the use will not be deemed
transformative and not a fair use. See Bouchat,
619 F.3d at 301 (plaintiff ‘s Shield Drawing was
adapted for a highly stylized Raven‘s ―Flying B‖
logo on helmets and uniforms, on the playing
field, and in posters, tickets, and advertising, but
all such uses as a logo still revealed and
reproduced the same valuable artistic expression
as the original Shield Drawing, and the product of
the changes and adaptations still carried the same
meaning and message as the original); Gaylord,
595 F.3d at 1364 (photograph and postage stamp
depicting plaintiff ‘s Korean War Memorial each
adapted and altered the appearance of the war
memorial to display a different tone and mood in
the depiction—gray, murky, fog of war in the
photograph, and stark, cold, loneliness of war in

I am citing the cases in the text of this article to draw attention to the
mode of demonstration of explanatory synthesis which requires specific
attention both to the principle induced from the data set and the
parentheticals provided after each citation supporting the principle.
Placement of the citations and parentheticals in the text is intended to
facilitate the reading of the parentheticals. I have also separated each
explanatory synthesis principle and citation string with a paragraph break to
facilitate reading.
52
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winter in the stamp—but the ultimate meaning
and message of the original memorial and the two
artistic adaptations was held to be the same: to
remember and celebrate Korean War Veterans;
thus, the uses were not fair); Bridgeport v. UMG,
585 F.3d at 267 (although defendant‘s sampling
placed the iconic Atomic Dog funk lyric and funk
track in an updated hip-hop recording, the funk
track was reproduced with little variance or
alteration from the original and was reused for
the same musical artistic purposes as the original,
and the hip-hop version of the sample carried the
same meaning and expression as the original: a
low tone beat and syncopated vocalization of the
same word, ―dog,‖ as heard in the original; thus,
the use was not fair); Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 132
(changing the format and medium of
entertainment material from the Seinfeld
television series to a trivia quiz format did not add
new and valuable artistic or entertainment
content to the original material, and did not
change the meaning, message, expression, or
purpose of the original material; thus, the use of
the original entertainment content was not fair).
A change in context for an artistic work even
without any changes to the content of the work
may be sufficient if the predominant purpose and
functioning of the new work is sufficiently
different from the original work and fulfills a goal
of the copyright laws. See Bouchat, 619 F.3d at
301 (use of original Shield Drawing in logos held
and displayed for historical and archival reasons
at the Baltimore Ravens‘ headquarters was a use
with a purpose and function different from the
artistic purpose and meaning of the original work;
historical, referential, and archival uses are
appropriate fair use purposes); Perfect 10 , 508
F.3d at 1146 (original photographs were reduced
in size to thumbnail images but otherwise
reproduced verbatim, but the purpose and
function of the thumbnails within a search engine
image search results screen was a completely new
function with a new and different purpose and
meaning from the artistic purposes and meaning
of the original photographs; the use fulfilled
proper fair use reference and research purposes);
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 605 (original
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images of concert posters were reduced in size but
otherwise reproduced verbatim, but the purpose
and function of the new use of the images—to
document a timeline of concert performances of
the Grateful Dead—was completely new and
different from the artistic purposes and meaning
of the original poster images and fulfilled proper
fair use archival, historical, referential, and
educational purposes); Kelly, 280 F.3d at 934 (as
in Perfect 10, use of original images in reduced
size for purpose of displaying search results in
internet image search engine was new function
with a new purpose and meaning for the images
that fulfilled proper fair use reference and
research purposes); Nunez, 235 F.3d at 18
(republication of original modeling portfolio
photographs without alteration but within new
context of news reporting of the actual existence of
the photographs themselves after subject became
Puerto Rico‘s Miss Universe contestant was a new
function with a new meaning and new purpose for
the photographs that met fair use news and
reference purposes); Sony Computer v. Bleem, 214
F.3d at 1022 (use of screen shots from original
computer game in comparative advertising to
critique the original images was fair use).
A change in context alone for artistic works is not
necessarily sufficient if the change does not have a
new purpose and function that communicates a
new meaning with new, valuable expression
furthering a goal of the copyright laws. See
Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 301 (aside from historical
and archival uses at Baltimore Ravens‘
headquarters, the general use of the plaintiff ‘s
Shield Drawing in stadium advertising, on the
field, on uniforms, on tickets and other
merchandise did not represent a new appropriate
function for the drawing and did not fulfill a
different artistic or creative purpose for the
original work, and thus, did not constitute a fair
use); Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1364 (function and
meaning of the original sculpture and the images
in the photograph and postage stamp were held to
be the same: to celebrate and remember Korean
War Veterans); Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 522
(change in form and function from audio recording
to karaoke soundtrack audio recording was not a
new function carrying new meaning or purpose
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from original musical recordings); Zomba
Enterprises, 491 F.3d at 574 (same); Elvis Presley
Enterprises v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d at 622
(video and audio segments from performances of
Elvis were placed in new context—a
comprehensive video biography work—but were
reproduced for the same purpose and carried the
same function and meaning as the original video
and audio recordings); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at
191 (copying two-minute segments of original
motion pictures for use as internal reference for
proprietary video database did not create a new
function carrying a new appropriate fair use
meaning and purpose different from the original
artistic works); On Davis, 246 F.3d at 152
(depiction of original artwork in print ad was a
new context for the work without any change in
artistic purpose and function of the original work);
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004
(facilitating a change in format from CD to MP3
format and changing context of recording to
facilitate unlicensed uncompensated file transfer
did not create a new function carrying a new
appropriate fair use meaning and purpose
different from the original artistic works); Infinity
Broadcasting, 150 F.3d at 104 (change in mode
and medium of communication from radio
broadcast to telephone communication did not
create a new function carrying a new appropriate
fair use meaning and purpose different from the
original artistic works); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70
(reproduction of story quilt image from authorized
museum poster to unauthorized use as set
dressing on television program did not create a
new function carrying a new appropriate fair use
meaning and purpose different from the original
artistic work).

A final set of examples uses European Court of Human Rights53 cases:
Under Article 10 of the European Human Rights
Convention, the European Court of Human Rights
takes a broad view of interferences with speech
that are ―prescribed by law‖ and support a ―legitimate aim‖ of government. See Nur Radyo v. Te53

Once again, I have used an abbreviated citation form to conserve space.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2012974

166

83-84 BAHÇEŞEHIR ÜNIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKÜLTESI-KAZANCI HUKUK DERGISI

levizyon Yayinciligi A.S. v. Turkey, App. No.
42284/05 at ¶ 47 (Jan. 12, 2011) (Court assumed
the interference with radio broadcasting of controversial religious messages was prescribed by
law and pursued a legitimate aim of protection of
national solidarity, peace and prosperity of society, and the reputation and rights of others); Poyraz v. Turkey, App. No. 15966/06 at ¶ 60 (Dec. 7,
2010) (interference with speech held prescribed by
the provisions of the Code of Obligations and the
Civil code, supported legitimate aim of protection
of the reputation rights of others); Gozel v. Turkey, App. No. 43453/04 at ¶ 43-45 (Oct. 6, 2010)
(Court found the interference with periodical publication prescribed by two separate statutes and
supported by a legitimate aim of fighting terrorism); Alinak v. Turkey, App. No. 40287/98 at ¶ 35
(Mar. 29, 2005) (interference with book distribution prescribed by the Constitution and Code of
Criminal Procedure and supported legitimate aim
of preventing crime); Sener v. Turkey, 37 E.H.RR.
34 at ¶¶ 32, 35 (2003) (interference prescribed by
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1991 and had a legitimate aim of protecting national security); Polat v. Turkey, App. No. 23500/94 at ¶¶ 36, 39
(July 8, 1999) (interference prescribed by Prevention of Terrorism Act and had a legitimate aim
of protection of national security and territorial
integrity).
Critical and derogatory statements about the government are subject to wider tolerance than critical or defamatory statements about an individual,
even a politician. Compare Gozel (statements accusing government of being a fascist dictatorship
did not justify interference with speech under Art.
10), and Alinak (fictional account of real-life atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the government did
not justify interference with speech under Art.
10), and Sener (article critical of the government‘s
treatment of Kurds, including accusations of
chemical warfare and genocide, did not justify interference with speech under Art. 10), and Polat
(book recounting factual details of atrocities committed by the government did not justify interference with speech under Art. 10), and Lingens v.
Austria, App. No. 9815/82 (July 8, 1986) (press
publication of allegations concerning politician‘s
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wartime improprieties did not justify interference
with speech and press under Art. 10), with Poyraz
(civil judgment based on vague but suggestive
statements to the press regarding an unnamed
public official under investigation for sexual harassment was valid and the enforcement thereof
did not violate Art. 10), and Barfod v. Denmark,
App. No. 11508/85 (Feb. 22, 1989) (civil judgment
based on personal attack on reputation of lay person members of tax tribunal was valid and the enforcement thereof did not violate Art. 10).
Allegedly illegal comments or statements must be
considered in the context of the work as a whole,
and the circumstances in which the statements
were made. See Gozel (journalist should not be
punished for merely publishing the statements of
a third party without adding any additional
statements or opinions that might be considered
illegal); Alinak (fictional account of events that allegedly took place should not be punished when
there is no reference to any real person); Sener
(statements made in a weekly review that were
critical of the government should be viewed in the
context of the essential role of the press in ensuring the proper functioning of a political democracy); Lingens (same); Polat (although critical of the
government, the statements in question pertained
to events in the past and were acceptable criticism
of the government).
An essential element to consider is whether the
expression in question could reasonably incite violence or be considered hate speech. See Gozel
(statements advocating for hunger strikes, although critical of the government, did not incite
others to violent behavior and should be protected); Alinak (overall hostile tone and graphic
images may incite violence if taken literally, but
in the context of a work of fiction, it would appeal
to a smaller audience and not be as dangerous);
Sener (although the writing expressed anger at
the government, it was an intellectual work and
not intended or likely to incite violence); Polat (literary work based on events in the past unlikely
to incite violent behavior in the present day).
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While prior restraints do not violate Art. 10 per
se, prior restraints are subject to much more careful scrutiny, and a restraint on future expression
as a punishment for previous acts is improper.
See Nur Radyo (six-month ban on broadcasting
based on a history of past violations which had
been the subject of other sanctions was not compatible with the rule of law); Gozel (one-month
ban on publication for publishing article accusing
the government of being a fascist dictatorship and
advocating hunger strikes was an improper punishment and a violation of Art. 10); Karademirci
v. Turkey, 44 E.H.R.R. (2007) (statute requiring
any association making a statement to the press
to file a copy of the statement with the public
prosecutor‘s office prior to making the statement
was improper because it did not adequately address what types of activity could lead to criminal
prosecution, and the current prosecution was not,
therefore, properly prescribed by law); Alinak
(seizure of all first editions of a fictional novel before dissemination was disproportionate especially
when the contents of the novel were considered in
context); Sener (editor‘s suspended sentence for a
previous action had the effect of a prior restraint
because the threat of a hefty penalty had the effect of restricting the applicant‘s work as an editor
and reducing her ability to offer the public information it had a right to receive).

These examples demonstrate the method of explanatory synthesis, but
they appear naked in the absence of a section of discourse applying the
induced principles to the facts of a client‘s case. The ―E‖—
Explanation—section using explanatory synthesis would in legal
discourse be followed by an ―A‖—Application—section applying the
principles to the client‘s facts. The E section would be drafted to
educate and persuade the audience as to the proper interpretation and
application of the law, and would be crafted to focus on the principles
that would be necessary for a determination or adjudication of the
client‘s issues. In short, the E and the A section would be crafted using
principles of legal rhetoric, as discussed in the next section.54

Section VI is derived in large part from the Socratic dialogue between
Socrates, Ireacus, and Treatis featured in Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 225-29 and 240-43, which
discusses the rhetoric of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis.
54
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VI. Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis in Legal Rhetoric
A.

The Rhetoric of Rule Synthesis

In classical rhetoric, rule synthesis is used primarily as a topic of
invention and secondarily as a topic of arrangement.55 The invention
fits the analysis of multiple authorities into a syllogistic structure
meeting logos objectives of the communication. It also is a topic of
arrangement involving open demonstration of the analysis—showing
your work, so to speak—which furthers the ethos objectives of the
analysis and communication.56 The structure of a proof—syllogistic
structure—is persuasive both substantively and rhetorically.
Substantively, it reveals the components of the analysis—the major
and the minor premises—to examination and refutation. This is the
concept of falsifiability.57 If the openly demonstrated analysis is not
refuted, it is held to be conclusive when the premises are capable of
conclusive determination; in other words, the proof is absolute when
both premises are absolutely and necessarily true, as in a true
syllogism. When the premises are not susceptible to conclusive
determination, as in most instances of legal analysis where the facts
and the law are not susceptible to absolute certainty of determination,
the syllogistic structure still is held to be highly persuasive because the
premises are openly demonstrated and exposed to examination and
refutation both as to the probability and accuracy of the statement of
the premises and the probability and reliability of the conclusion
drawn from the premises.58
Rule synthesis is a form of open demonstration of the analysis of
Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. &
RHET. at 225.
56
The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof
is the syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and
legal argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 1,
at 1355a (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., Random House 1954).
In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the applicable legal
principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the specific
circumstances of the case at hand so as to describe a highly probable
conclusion or prediction about the application. Id. See also Murray, Rule
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 225.
57
Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. &
RHET. at 226.
58
Id. at 226.
55
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examples (authorities) that inform the major premise (the rules, legal
standards) of the syllogistic structure of the enthymeme in legal
reasoning. It is falsifiable because the synthesis reveals the
authorities that are synthesized. If the components of the analysis of
the combinations of authorities and the principles induced from these
combinations are not challenged or rebutted, the demonstration
promotes persuasion from the logical arrangement, and it promotes
credibility and benevolence from the frankness and candor of this form
of demonstration.59
In modern argument theory,60 rule synthesis involves coding the
discourse through analysis of relevant authorities and places the
analysis within the enthymatic structure of an argument of
probabilities. The syllogistic structure of the enthymeme in modern
argument (or practical reasoning) constructs the most probable
definition of the major premise of the argument, followed by the most
probable statement of the facts and circumstances at hand in the
problem and its rhetorical situation. Rule synthesis, with its open and
falsifiable rendering of the components of the analysis and the
principles induced from the examination and combinations of the
In classical rhetoric, the example was the rhetorical companion of the
induction, much in the same way that the enthymeme was the companion of
the syllogism. Both forms, the example and the induction, seek to induce
information—construct truth, if you will—from subjects or examples, the
difference being that an induction uses absolute, conclusive truths about the
genus and species principles that are demonstrated in the induction, and an
example uses probability about the genus and species principles that are
demonstrated in the example. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 2 at
1356b, bk. II, ch. 19 at 1392a–1392b. See also Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 226-27.
60
On modern argument theory, see Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor,
59

Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 949 (2007)
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What
is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004) (use of
metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); JEROME
BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002);
CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (1969); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and
Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ALWD 129, 139 (2006);
Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ALWD 75, 80–
81 (2009); FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984).
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components, creates a highly probable and thus highly persuasive
major premise of the argument.61
In writing-as-a-process theory,62 rule synthesis involves the open
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing
and combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the
author and her audience. The process constructs the rule section—it
defines the legal standards that govern the issue of the discourse for
the benefit of the author and the audience. The careful, open, and
demonstrative process of rule synthesis allows the author to better
understand the rules and their requirements, exceptions, and
limitations, and in turn allows the audience to understand the same
requirements, exceptions, and limitations of the rules defining the
analysis and the discourse. The process of rule synthesis analysis is
reflective and recursive, causing the author to revisit the same
authorities multiple times to compare them and to induce from them
different nuances of the meaning of the rules to best address the
problem and its audience and rhetorical situation. This produces work
that is both inventive and persuasive in bringing the audience to an
understanding and conviction concerning the discourse.63
Under discourse community theory,64 the process of reasoning through
61

See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM.
& RHET. at 227-28.
62
On writing-as-a-process theory, see Linda L. Berger, A Reflective
Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 Leg.
Writing 57 (2000); Berger, New Rhetoric, supra note 20; Elizabeth Fajans &
Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78
Cornell L. Rev. 163 (1993); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, ―To Say What the Law Is‖:
Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995); Carol
McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools
Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin
Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, supra note
57, at 141.
63
See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM.
& RHET. at 228.
64
On modern discourse community theory, see Brook K. Baker,
Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to In―doctrine‖ation in
the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz‗s Critical
Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 John Marshall L. Rev.
131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering
the Discourse of Law, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002); Pollman, supra n. 9; J.
Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69
Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1994); Smith, supra n. 57, at 143; Kathryn M. Stanchi,
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synthesis to inform the major premise—the R section—of the analysis
has become the accepted and expected structure and process of
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Rule synthesis
devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their rank in the
hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by the legal writing discourse
community. Rule synthesis also follows the discourse community‘s
expectations that a combination of authorities must be used to make a
single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles that govern
the legal issue at hand.65
B. The Rhetoric of Explanatory Synthesis
Explanatory synthesis has all of the rhetorical advantages of rule
synthesis and quite a few other advantages over direct case-to-case
analogical reasoning. Rule synthesis meets modern argument theory
objectives of practical reasoning through an inductive method to
inform the major premise of the syllogistic argument form.
Explanatory synthesis follows a similar method of inductive reasoning
to construct the most probable explanation of how the rules apply to
varying factual situations in multiple authorities. Explanatory
synthesis, with its open and falsifiable induction of interpretive
principles from a sample set of controlling authorities creates a highly
probable and thus highly persuasive argument concerning the
66
application of the rules.
In writing-process theory, explanatory synthesis involves the open
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing
and combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the
author and her audience regarding the various ways the rules interact
with the facts of cases and the public policies of the area of law. The
process constructs the explanation section—it defines the principles of
interpretation and application that will govern the application of the
rules to the issue for the benefit of the author and the audience. The
careful, open, and demonstrative process of explanatory synthesis
allows the author to better understand the application of the rules and
how this implicates the public policies of the area and the values of the
Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law‗s
Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 7 (1998); Joseph M.
Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and
Development, 1 Leg. Writing 1 (1991).
65
See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM.
& RHET. at 229.
66
Id. at 240-41.
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audience, and in turn demonstrates these lessons for the education and
persuasion of the audience. The process of explanatory synthesis
analysis is reflective and recursive, causing the author to revisit the
same authorities multiple times to compare them and to induce from
them different nuances of the rules and policies, and to draw out the
different narratives of success and failure under the applications of the
rules. This reflective and recursive process constructs an explanation
section that best addresses the problem and its audience and rhetorical
situation. This produces work that is both inventive and persuasive in
bringing the audience to an understanding and conviction concerning
the discourse.67
Under discourse-community theory, the process of reasoning through
synthesis to inform the second half of the major premise—the E section
of the analysis—is the accepted and expected structure and process of
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Explanatory
synthesis devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their
rank in the hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by that community.
Explanatory synthesis can develop many and varied principles of
interpretation—many more than direct analogical reasoning—because
it can work with a much larger number of authorities, and weave them
together so that the client‘s case can be analogized to whole groups of
favorable precedents and distinguished from whole groups of
unfavorable precedents.68
Explanatory synthesis as used in the TREAT format also is
rhetorically advantageous under the newest school of contemporary
rhetoric—law and economics. The rhetorical canons of contemporary
law and economics apply four topoi of invention and arrangement and
four style tropes to legal discourse: the primacy of the forms of analysis
of mathematics and science, the concept of law as a system of
incentives and costs, the rhetorical theory of efficiency, and the
rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational-choice theory.69
The syllogistic and inductive structures of TREAT and explanatory
synthesis are the same structures used in mathematical and scientific
proof. The very concept that the components of a legal argument can be
phrased in the form of an induction and a syllogism taking the form of
a proof enhances the persuasiveness of the discourse. This is both
67
68
69

Id. at 241.
Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
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rhetorically advantageous and substantively advantageous because the
power of the mathematical and scientific forms of proof lies in their
open demonstration of the steps and components of the analysis in a
transparent and falsifiable presentation.70 Explanatory synthesis
further incorporates the advantages of mathematics and science by
increasing the number of authorities that can efficiently be analyzed in
the discourse and from which the principles of interpretation can be
induced, thus increasing the reliability of the analysis. Explanatory
synthesis in effect increases the number—the ―n‖—of the sample set,
which increases the reliability and persuasiveness of the principles
induced from that sample set. Because the method allows for
exposition of many interpretive principles using multiple authorities in
a comparatively small amount of space (roughly one-third to one-half
page per synthesis, depending on the number of authorities
synthesized and the length and complexity of the parentheticals
required), explanatory synthesis provides an elegant solution to the
rhetorical problem of the client‘s situation, which is preferred by
mathematics and science.71
Explanatory synthesis performs an open demonstration of the analysis
of multiple authorities as an incentive to the reader. The reader is
invited to avoid the cost of delving into such a large number of
authorities because the work of the analysis has been performed openly,
subject to examination and refutation. Opaque or unsubstantiated
reasoning, overworking or stretching an analogy to a precedent that is
not closely aligned to the client‘s narrative and rhetorical situation,
imposes a cost on the reader who must take the time to unpack the
analogy, evaluate whether it is analogous, and still might have to
invest the time to compare the analogy to other controlling authorities
that also are on point.72
Explanatory synthesis is efficient in its method of using a greater
number of authorities to substantiate and apply a greater number of
interpretive principles to make a more persuasive discourse. It also
allows for the demonstration of patterns of narratives and storylines
found in more than one authority so as to appeal to the values and
preferences of the modern, rational audience. The typical legal
audience is prone to the same biases and heuristics as any audience of
decision-makers, and explanatory synthesis creates opportunities to
70

Id.
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anticipate and target audience biases or shortcuts. Explanatory
synthesis, compared to direct analogical reasoning, does not put all of
the rhetorical eggs in one or two baskets by relying on the principles of
interpretation and application that can be learned from one or two
precedents. It can present a series of interpretive principles to address
many different audiences and situations, and support the principles
with a larger number of authorities.73
VII. Conclusion
Rule synthesis is the evaluation and analysis of controlling authorities
on a legal issue to derive the actual rules that govern a legal issue.
Rule synthesis is the process of analysis to determine what the law is
that governs an issue. Explanatory synthesis examines concrete,
specific examples of situations (cases) where the rules have been
applied to produce a concrete outcome in order to induce principles and
illustrations about how the law works in various relevant situations.
Explanatory synthesis seeks not to determine what the law is but
rather how the law works in these relevant situations in order to make
reliable, persuasive predictions about how the law will work in future
situations where the applicable rules will be applied.
In comparative perspective, rule synthesis is derived from the Common
Law doctrine of precedent and the principle of stare decisis, and,
therefore, it is has a more limited application in civilian legal analysis.
But explanatory synthesis is applicable to both systems of legal
analysis and persuasion because it is based on logical induction of
principles and illustrations from cases, not to define the controlling
rules but to demonstrate and illustrate how the rules work so as to
make reliable, persuasive predictions about how the rules will work in
future situations. The principles induced and illustrated in
explanatory synthesis do not depend on the doctrines of precedent and
stare decisis but on a more fundamental rhetorical assumption shared
by common law and civil law legal analysis: that courts and tribunals
do not act randomly and capriciously, and that rulings over time are
reliable for anticipating future rulings in future situations. In this way,
explanatory synthesis is a method of analysis and rhetoric that
partners well with the common law doctrine of precedent and the civil
law doctrine of jurisprudence constante.74 The principles induced
through explanatory synthesis are not perfect in the sense of syllogistic,
73
74

Id.
See sources cited in notes 8-10, supra.
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mathematical proof, but are reliable and persuasive in the nature of
scientific induction in modern legal rhetoric.
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